

SECRET6666/6
P-103
Personnel

12 May 1980

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Personnel Policy, Planning
and Management

FROM: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Senior Intelligence Service Statistics

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1. Thanks for the excellent paper (ER 80-666/5) on promotion policy at a time of high requirement. I am most impressed and encouraged by what you and your team have been able to produce here in terms of good analysis of a difficult and elusive problem. I'm ready to proceed on something very close to what you have recommended here.

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2. Would you look at the following additional considerations:

a. As I read Table 2, the total SIS 1-4 in all career services except "I" service will have a larger number at the end of FY 80 than FY 81. In FY 82, they will go back up again and continue upward in 1983. It seems to me that it will be easier on everyone if we don't put a hump in the FY 1980 figures but rather have them come out half way between the actual figures today and the end FY 81 figures, e.g.,

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b. I also wonder if it might not be better to stretch the return to the level over five years rather than three and one-half. My judgment on this is simply an instinct that we may be giving the people who come up for supergrade in the next three years a substantially higher opportunity than those who will be coming up in the subsequent three years. In your memo on the top of page 2, you mention that the "...significant focus is on the appropriate rate of draw from the feeder group." I wonder if the rate of draw for the feeder groups that will be under consideration in the next three fiscal years won't be quite high. If it is, stretching out the return would make things more equitable.

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1. ER 80-666/5

2. Reply

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c. I am frankly not at all concerned about losing any of these positions to OMB action. I learned the other day that NSA has been running well below its supergrade ceiling for some years. Admiral Inman is working his way back up gradually in order not to make the rate of draw too high for any particular feeder group. On top of that, with the whole government facing this problem of mass exodus of supergrades, I think it will become apparent that we are all going to have to do something like this.

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d. I also wonder if you can give me any feeling for the impact that running at numbers like [] for a total SIS 1-4 will have on the promotion opportunities to GS-13, 14, and 15. If I understand the rules of the game, we should be able to increase our complement of 13s, 14s and 15s because of the points we save by having less than [] SIS 1-4s. It seems to me it is most important to do this for several reasons. First, it allows us to put the maximum pay into the system so that our employees will benefit. Next, it increases the promotion opportunity to the pre-supergrade levels. As we go through this trauma of accelerated opportunity for promotion to supergrade, a problem will be that we don't have enough opportunity to groom people at the medium levels; thus, if we can increase promotion to these levels, and assuming that people in these levels are going to have to fill some of the positions that are allocated for supergrades, we will broaden the feeder group and its experience. In short, we will have a better opportunity to judge who really deserves to be a supergrade when the time comes. Finally, it seems to me that we are more likely to have a retention problem with people at the 13, 14 and 15 levels than we are with supergrades; hence, increasing the promotion opportunity here as long as we have the chance to do so could pay large benefits.

e. One point I'm not clear on is the DCI reserve for [] SPS positions. Could you let me know what that is all about.

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f. I'm also a bit confused by the differences between Table 3 and Table 2. I understand Table 2 to say we had [] SIS 1-4 on board as of the 31st of March; Table 3 seems to have [] In addition, the numbers for each of the individual career services seem to be different. []

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